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Previous explanations of the Chinese Communist revolution have highlighted (variously) the 
role of ideology, organization, and/or social structure.  While acknowledging the importance of 
all these factors, this article draws attention to a largely neglected feature of the revolutionary 
process: the mass mobilization of emotions.  Building upon pre-existing traditions of popular 
protest and political culture, the Communists systematized “emotion work” as part of a 
conscious strategy of psychological engineering.  Attention to the emotional dimensions of mass 
mobilization was a key ingredient in the Communists’ revolutionary victory, distinguishing 
their approach from that of their Guomindang rivals.  Moreover, patterns of emotion work 
developed during the wartime years lived on in the People’s Republic of China, shaping a 
succession of state-sponsored mass campaigns under Mao.   Even in post-Mao China, this 
legacy continues to exert a powerful influence over the attitudes and actions of state authorities 
and ordinary citizens alike.   
   
 
 
The stunning victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949, which occurred more swiftly and 
decisively than either side anticipated, has sparked a good deal of analysis and debate among 
students of revolution. For the most part explanations have focused on ideological issues, 
arguing variously that it was a commitment to nationalism, land reform, or some combination 
of the two that accounts for the Communists’ impressive success vis a vis their Guomindang 
rivals (Snow 1963; Taylor 1940; Johnson 1962; Hinton 1967; Selden 1971; Kataoka 1974; 
Pepper 1978). To a lesser extent, scholars have stressed the organizational superiority of the 
Communists (Hofheinz 1977; Chen 1986). Recently, attention has also been directed at the 
powerful role of symbols and myths in fueling the Communist advance (Wasserstrom 1991; 
Apter and Saich 1994). 
  Undoubtedly, ideology, organization, and symbolism culture all played crucial roles 
in the revolutionary process. So too did structural factors such as class cleavages, international 
pressures, and state weakness (Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979). And yet one could argue that the 
Communists and Guomindang actually shared more similarities than differences on all these 
dimensions. Both parties (which had been founded along classic Bolshevik lines) embraced 
the nationalist cum revolutionary program of Sun Yat-sen, both espoused opposition to 
imperialism and support for land reform, both advocated state-led industrialization, both 
esteemed the memories of the 1911 Revolution, the May Fourth Movement, the Northern 
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Expedition, and other legendary milestones in the revolutionary saga, and both operated in the 
same explosive setting.  
  If the political vocabulary and structural environments of the two parties were 
remarkably congruent, the same cannot be said of the response that they evoked from ordinary 
Chinese. While the dashing “Christian Generalissimo” Chiang Kai-shek and his Wellesley-
educated wife may have been the darlings of the American press and Congress, their reception 
back home was a different story altogether. In China it was the earthy peasant Mao Zedong 
who moved his compatriots, first to tears and anger, and then to revolutionary action.   
  The glaring disparity in the outcomes of the Communist [CCP] and Guomindang 
[GMD] movements points to a more general lesson that students of revolutionary politics 
have only recently begun to address: the translation of radical ideas and images into 
purposeful and effective action demands not only conducive environmental conditions, but 
also substantial emotional engagement on the part of leaders and followers alike (Gamson 
1992; Taylor 1995; Aminzade and McAdam 2001). Indeed, the Chinese case can be read as a 
textbook illustration of how emotional energy may (or may not) be harnessed to revolutionary 
designs.  
  In contrast to the publicly restrained Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong was a master at 
connecting passion and politics.  But it was not only at the elite leadership level that we can 
detect such differences. The two revolutionary efforts differed from top to bottom in the 
extent to which they relied upon what Hochschild has termed “emotion work”—or “the act of 
trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling”—in pursuing their goals 
(Hochschild 1979). Through such techniques as “speaking bitterness” (suku), “denunciation” 
(kongsu), “criticism-self criticism” (piping-ziwo piping), “rectification” (zhengfeng) and 
“thought reform” (sixiang gaizao), the Chinese Communists—in stark contrast to their 
Guomindang opponents—heightened emotional commitment among cadres as well as 
ordinary recruits to their cause. The dedication born of this “emotion-raising” (tigao qingxu) 
was a key ingredient in the campaigns against Japanese soldiers and Chinese landlords alike. 
The millions who enlisted on the side of the Red Army were probably motivated less by some 
abstract affinity for the principles of nationalism or land reform than by heartfelt allegiance to 
a highly charged crusade. 
  How did the Communists succeed in generating such devotion? And, equally 
important, what were the long-term effects of their methods of revolutionary mobilization? 
This article will examine the process and legacy of Communist “emotion work” through 
reconsideration of the major mass campaigns of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary eras. 
Eyewitness accounts of land reform, while highlighting the ideological aims of the movement, 
nevertheless provide valuable information on ways in which the Communists encouraged—
indeed demanded—public expressions of anger, fear, and shame (Myrdal 1965; Hinton 1967; 
Snow 1963; Crook and Crook 1979; Endicott 1991). Cadre handbooks offer more detailed 
guides to the specific steps involved in mobilizing emotional energy for revolutionary 
purposes (Li 1942).  
  As previous scholars have noted, such techniques drew creatively upon dominant 
themes in Chinese political discourse that emphasize group—more than individual—bases of 
morality (Lifton 1963; Cialdani 1993; Solomon 1971). The Confucian stress upon social 
bonds and obligations made group ostracism a particularly potent form of emotional 
discipline.
1 Building a sense of collective solidarity, in China as in other societies, was a 
fundamental element of revolutionary mobilization. 
  Although the emotional intensity required for the expropriation of land (and 
execution of landlords) could not be sustained indefinitely, it was rekindled during subsequent 
campaigns—well after the political victory of the CCP in 1949. The paper will trace ways in 
which the patterns of emotion work developed during the wartime years lived on in the 
People’s Republic of China, deeply influencing such initiatives as the Suppression of 
Counter-Revolutionaries, the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Great Leap Forward and the Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution 
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Cultural Revolution. A hallmark of the Maoist period was the attempt to “continue the 
revolution,” applying lessons from the pre-1949 struggle to new goals of economic 
development and political consolidation. Even in the contemporary post-Mao era, such 
legacies are far from irrelevant to an understanding of Chinese political dynamics. But 
techniques that proved highly efficacious in the battle against landlords and Japanese invaders 
yielded quite different results in the changed circumstances of the post-revolutionary scene. 
 
MOBILIZING THE REVOLUTION: PEASANTS 
 
Of course, the use of emotional fervor in mass mobilization was not an invention of the 
Chinese Communists. For centuries before the advent of the Red Army, peasant uprisings had 
drawn upon a panoply of folk techniques—martial arts routines, breathing regimens, spirit 
possession, sworn oaths, operatic performances, and the like—whose effect was to strengthen 
the emotional resolve of participants (Chesneaux 1973; Esherick 1987). Both Peng Pai and 
Mao Zedong, as early leaders of the Communists’ peasant movement, expressed high regard 
for indigenous repertoires of rural resistance and advocated that such traditions be redirected 
toward revolutionary ends (Galbiati 1985; Mao 1971: 23-39).  
  While it is not clear that previous rebel leaders were entirely cognizant of the role of 
“emotion work” in generating popular enthusiasm for their enterprise, the Communists were 
quite deliberate in their use of such tactics. The growth of the revolutionary movement was 
marked by increasing attention to the importance of “emotion-raising” in the process of mass 
mobilization.  
  Theater was a critical means of eliciting an emotional reaction that was used 
intentionally to solidify popular commitment. A propaganda worker in the Jiangxi Soviet 
recalled of the make-shift dramatic performances that were staged to generate support for the 
Red Army: 
 
When the audience watched comic scenes they laughed loudly; when they 
watched tragic scenes they lowered their heads and wept or angrily 
denounced the landlords. Thus we knew that the drama had deeply stirred 
the audience, achieving propaganda results. How happy we were then! (Pan 
1962: 146) 
 
Once moved by such performances, peasant recruits were encouraged to articulate their own 
accusations against their former oppressors. As a propaganda worker in the Northeast noted, 
“We felt that speaking bitterness was extremely effective in stimulating class hatreds and 
heightening feelings of vengeance…. The purpose of war became clear, and the emotions of 
the troops were raised” (Mo 1991: 194). 
  American journalist Edgar Snow, who interviewed Communist leaders after their 
epic Long March, also highlighted the role of theater in the Communists’ mobilization drive: 
“There was no more powerful weapon of propaganda in the Communist movement than the 
Reds’ dramatic troupes, and none more subtly manipulated…. When the Reds occupied new 
areas, it was the Red Theater that calmed the fears of the people, gave them rudimentary ideas 
of the Red program, and dispensed great quantities of revolutionary thoughts, to win the 
people’s confidence” (Snow 1963: 123-124). The use of theatrical performances to mobilize 
the masses grew out of an old tradition that linked rural opera and peasant protest (Esherick 
1987). In the early twentieth century, prior to the advent of the Communists, spoken drama 
(as opposed to opera) became a powerful means of communicating revolutionary messages 
(MacKerras 1975: 48-49). 
  Drama was not merely one tactic in an arsenal of mass mobilization methods; it was, 
in a sense, a metaphor for the entire enterprise (Turner 1974; 1982). Staged public 
performances have constituted the very heart and soul of the Chinese Communist revolution, Mobilization 
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from the days of land reform right down to the 1999 campaign against Falun Gong.
2 This is 
not to imply, however, that the emotions expressed in such contexts are somehow phony or 
inauthentic. A distinctive facet of human feelings is their ambivalence and malleability; the 
genius of the CCP approach lay in its capacity to appreciate and capitalize on this 
fundamental reality.  
  If the Communists learned the rudiments of emotion work during the Jiangxi period 
(1928-34) and subsequent forced march to Yan’an, they put the lessons to good use in the war 
against Japan (1937-45). The land reform that proved so crucial to the establishment of 
wartime base areas was introduced to the peasantry by carefully orchestrated struggle 
sessions. As Chen Yung-fa’s definitive study indicates, the land revolution unfolded as a kind 
of mass theatrical performance whose purpose was to harness emotional excitement to the 
Communist cause: 
 
Having chosen the targets, the party called all local cadres and activists into 
a mobilization meeting to explain the decision and assign each a role. The 
mass workers announced the targets, presented the accusations and 
evidence, and tried to stir anger against the targets. Then a division of labor 
was formalized. A mass worker assigned activists to be chairman, chief 
accuser, second accuser, guards, master of ceremonies, and accountant, and 
coached the activists on how to perform their assigned jobs…. Sometimes 
activists were specially assigned to stir up public indignation…. 
 
Finally the big day arrived. Peasants were mobilized to attend the struggle 
meeting. The target was brought in. The chairman made a brief speech 
about the meaning of the struggle meeting. And then the victims charged 
their abusers, pointed accusing fingers, screamed, and wept. Secondary 
accusers could then stand up and give their testimony. The atmosphere of 
rage was further heightened by slogan shouting. Peasants who had harbored 
grudges against the target, but out of moral reservations or mortal fear had 
suppressed them, now suddenly felt unable to restrain their indignation. 
Assured of sympathetic ears and powerful support, they lashed out, and 
even those who did not harbor grudges felt sympathy and sought ways to 
express it (Chen 1986: 186-187).  
 
The size of a struggle meeting was a key variable in determining its emotional climate: 
“When only a few dozen people were present, the mass worker usually found little response 
to emotional charges against a target, but, in an agitated group of hundreds or thousands, 
peasants soon forgot their vulnerability…and acted like totally different people. They became 
bold and aggressive” (Chen 1986: 187).  
  Active mass involvement was a hallmark of Mao’s revolution, but as Mao and his 
lieutenants understood, it was easy for large, emotionally charged convocations to get out of 
hand. Thus an important item in cadre training concerned the prevention of “leftist excesses.”
3 
Although mass violence was accepted, and sometimes even celebrated as an integral part of 
the revolutionary process, physical force was to be used strategically rather than 
indiscriminately.
4  
  Violence, if appropriately applied, could have the effect of releasing previous 
inhibitions by suddenly reversing the perception of authority relations.
5 William Hinton’s 
sympathetic account of the land reform in Long Bow Village reveals the reluctance of 
peasants to voice their grievances until a cadre’s slap altered the local balance of power: 
 
The silent crowd contracted toward the spot where the accused man 
stood…. The peasants were listening to every word but gave no sign as to Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution 
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how they felt…. no one moved and no one spoke. “Come now, who has 
evidence against this man?” Again there was silence. Kuei-ts’ai, the new 
vice-chairman of the village, found it intolerable. He jumped up, struck Kuo 
Te-yu on the jaw with the flat of his hand. “Tell the meeting how much you 
stole,” he demanded. 
 
The blow jarred the ragged crowd. It was as if an electric spark had tensed 
every muscle. Not in living memory had any peasant ever struck an 
official…. 
  
The people in the square waited fascinated, as if watching a play. They did 
not realize that in order for the plot to unfold they themselves had to mount 
the stage and speak out what was on their minds (Hinton 1967: 112-114).  
 
After a night of tense meetings in which “some people were so excited they did not sleep at 
all,” Hinton reports that the following day “hundreds of accusations” came pouring out 
against the party-selected targets, who were then taken to a field at the edge of a village and 
shot (Hinton 1967: 115-117).
6  
  Once cadre activists had opened the door to emotional contestation, village women 
were often the first to enter the fray. Their gender having accustomed them to an expressive 
mode of communication, women inveighed against past injustices with particular fervor. As 
Hinton observes, “by ‘speaking pains to recall pains,’ the women found that they had as many 
if not more grievances than the men and that once given a chance to speak in public they were 
as good at it as their fathers and husbands” (Hinton 1967: 157). 
  The reactions of the masses were not the cadres’ only concern in these struggle 
sessions; the targets of attack might also prove problematic. Those who were selected as 
victims for public criticism, it was emphasized, should be neither overly recalcitrant nor 
unduly acquiescent. As Chen Yung-fa explains, “Defiance by a stubborn target might result in 
a deadlock. To save the situation, the mass worker was asked to intervene in such a way as to 
give peasants a sense of assurance…. Because a struggle meeting without resistance excited 
few peasants, the party also cautioned against choosing easy objects” (Chen 1986: 189). 
  Although—or rather precisely because—the struggle meetings were cleverly 
choreographed, the emotional impact on participants was obviously intense. Accounts of 
Communist-directed land reform concur in stressing the catalytic role of fear, grief, rage and 
revenge in energizing the course of popular participation.
7 Appeals to sentiments of fairness 
(gongping) also figured centrally in the process (Chen, Xue, and Ma 1985).
8 
  Crucial as mass mobilization was to the Communist effort, it is important to 
remember that the Communists were not the only self-proclaimed Chinese revolutionaries to 
undertake such campaigns. In the late 1940s, while still struggling against the CCP on the 
mainland, the GMD launched a “liquidate traitors’ campaign” (xiaojian yundong) intended to 
ferret out enemy forces within the industrial proletariat. Much like the Communists, the 
Guomindang authorities declared that “there are no genuine traitors among our workers, just 
people being used by traitors.” The goal of the campaign was to encourage confessions of 
wrongdoing by Communist fellow-travelers. In contrast to the CCP, however, GMD 
campaign directives called not for emotional denunciations but rather for the cultivation of 
“high-minded character” and “a resolute will.” The emphasis was decidedly ethical, rather 
than emotional (Shanghai Municipal Archives #Q6-31-132). 
  After retreating to Taiwan, the Guomindang initiated other explicitly political mass 
campaigns. A cadre handbook on mass movements, published in Taipei in 1954 by the 
Central Committee of the GMD, gave detailed instructions on how to implement the “Anti-
Communism Anti-Russian Mass Campaign” (fangong kang’e minzhong yundong) that had 
recently been announced on Taiwan.  But if the outward form of mass movements on both Mobilization 
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sides of the Straits was surprisingly similar, the actual methods of implementation differed 
markedly. Tellingly, the handbook for GMD cadres includes lengthy discussions of ideology 
(yishi), policy (zhengce), organization (zuzhi), and leadership (lingdao)—but not a word about 
emotions (Guomindang 1954). 
 
EXTENDING THE REVOLUTION: WORKERS 
 
On the mainland, however, the practices of emotion work developed during the revolutionary 
era were systematized and standardized after the political victory in 1949. Techniques that 
had proven effective in the course of land reform were now extended to an urban context as 
well. Thus the campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries, which swept across Chinese 
cities during the Korean War, was carried out by means of speak-bitterness and accusation 
meetings of the very sort that had long characterized the rural revolution. To familiarize urban 
cadres with these procedures, internal-circulation bulletins were issued, spelling out in detail 
the steps involved in organizing such events.
9 The circulars stressed that a prerequisite to 
success lay in overcoming “tenderheartedness” (wenqingzhuyi); workers must be made to 
realize that benevolence toward counter-revolutionaries was tantamount to cruelty toward the 
people. The purpose of the mass meetings was to arouse sufficient indignation on the part of 
ordinary people that they would participate actively—indeed gleefully—in the liquidation of 
designated class enemies. Moreover, they were then supposed to return to work with renewed 
enthusiasm for production. To ensure the proper results, emotion work would need to be 
carefully controlled by cadre leadership. 
  The instructions for union cadres stipulated that they must concentrate on “raising 
emotions” (tigao qingxu) and encouraging “gutsy accusations” (dadan kongsu). It was 
suggested that try-outs and dress rehearsals be held in order first to select the most convincing 
“hosts of bitterness” (kuzhu) and then to coach these protagonists on how to deliver their 
denunciations most effectively. Presentations needed to be short, succinct, and substantive 
(Shanghai Municipal Archives, #B168-1-804: 43). The best hosts were said to be those with 
“representative qualities” (you daibiaoxing), who had suffered greatly at the hands of the 
alleged counter-revolutionaries. It was acknowledged that the hosts were likely to harbor 
misgivings about their performance; their fears might include wronging someone, meddling in 
other people’s affairs, provoking revenge, losing face, or simply being a poor public speaker. 
Cadres needed to be sensitive to such concerns so that they could alleviate doubts and 
promote activism. When organizing accusation meetings among Christian converts, for ex-
ample, cadres tried to overcome their initial reluctance to cast the first stone by reminding the 
faithful that Jesus himself had used accusation methods against the Pharisees! (Shanghai 
Municipal Archives #B168-1-804: 43). Those who were chosen as hosts of bitterness were 
also encouraged to offer one another suggestions during the dress rehearsal so that they would 
all prove as persuasive as possible during their presentations, “capable of stirring up grudges” 
(neng jiqi chouhen) and “exciting mass passions” (gudong qunzhong qingxu).  
  Before the mass meeting was convened, “all means of propaganda”—big-character 
posters, broadcasts, recreational activities, group and individual discussions, and the like—
should be employed so as to prepare ordinary participants for the occasion. It was recom-
mended that an exhibit be set up adjacent to the meeting hall to display bloody clothes and 
other personal effects belonging to victims of the accused, along with weapons used by the 
perpetrators and sketches and photographs of their crimes. Inside the hall, banners made of 
black cloth with white lettering and blue borders (reminiscent of funeral regalia) were to be 
hung together with cartoons depicting criminal activities. The combined effect, it was said, 
would create an atmosphere at once “solemn yet lively.” 
  Tickets were to be issued in advance, to exclude those who had “reactionary” 
connections, so that the masses would feel no inhibitions (gulü) in speaking out.  During the 
meeting itself, the chair was enjoined to pay close attention to controlling the emotional Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution 
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climate. Meetings were to last no longer than an hour and fifteen minutes so as to avoid the 
tedium that might otherwise set in. At appropriate moments, songs taught to the workers 
beforehand might be intoned to enliven the proceedings. These were to be led by pre-
appointed propaganda team members. Additionally, party and youth league members should 
be scattered among the audience to assist in shouting slogans. Such slogans must be brief and 
easily grasped; those who led in shouting them should be carefully selected beforehand on the 
basis of their standing among the masses as well as their clear and forceful voices. The point 
was to stir up emotions, but not to dissolve into disorder.  
  It was emphasized that the lead-off host of bitterness must be particularly dramatic, 
so as to capture audience attention from the start. Since such emotional intensity could not be 
sustained indefinitely, subsequent accusers might be a bit less gripping. However, it was 
essential to “re-tighten” before the end of the meeting to ensure that the audience would 
depart with lasting sentiments of grief and indignation (beifen). One criterion of a successful 
meeting was that it had “spared no one’s feelings” (pochu qingmian) (Shanghai Municipal 
Archives #B169-1-804: 43). Preferably, the meeting would adjourn before all hosts had 
delivered their accusations, thereby preserving a sense of unfinished business.  
  Workers whose bodies bore the marks of torture were favored for the lead-off role as 
hosts of bitterness. At the Number Six Cotton Mill, a worker whose hand had been severed by 
the accused initiated the criticism. After mounting the stage, the one-handed worker removed 
his clothes to reveal the scars of wounds inflicted by the culprit. He was then followed by 
several women who burst into tears while shouting their denunciations. Sobbing, the entire 
audience began to scream in one voice to demand immediate death for the accused. 
  The success of an accusation meeting could be gauged by the level of enthusiasm 
that the masses demonstrated in carrying out the appointed executions. The railway union 
reported with evident satisfaction that, following a mass meeting at which eight counter-
revolutionaries were sentenced to death, participants were so riled up that they stomped on the 
heads of the victims after their execution by firing squad at a nearby park. Seeing that some 
relatives of the deceased had dissolved into tears, the accusers yelled out, “Why cry? To die 
by a single bullet is too good for the likes of them. If you cry, we’ll laugh!” (Shanghai 
Municipal Archives #C1-2-397). Such emotional states allegedly had a utility that outlasted 
the act of killing; they were deemed beneficial for production as well. The railway union 
noted that on-the-job enthusiasm had increased markedly after this searing event. 
  Emotional excitement was essential to mass activism, but it was also inherently 
dangerous. In more than a few instances, workers fired up by the fervor of the Suppression of 
Counter-Revolutionaries Campaign took matters into their own hands, attacking suspects 
without the prior approval of public security authorities. Such spontaneous expressions of 
mass justice helped underscore the importance of bureaucratic control.  
 
DISCIPLINING THE REVOLUTION: ELITE RECTIFICATION 
 
Mass criticisms, and the public executions of landlords and counter-revolutionaries that often 
followed in their wake, were a highly visible yet inherently ephemeral way of harnessing 
emotional energies to revolutionary ends. In other times and places, emotional mobilization 
has proven notoriously difficult both to sustain and to prevent from devolving into sectarian 
strife led by competing elites (Gough 1998; Stunt 2000). In the Chinese case, less public yet 
more enduring methods were developed to strengthen and discipline the resolve of those 
whose continuing service to the revolutionary cause was deemed essential: party members 
and intellectuals in particular. 
  During the wartime era, alongside the speak-bitterness and accusation sessions in 
which peasants—under party direction—found a collective voice with which to denounce 
their oppressors, other procedures were devised to handle intra-party discipline. In the early 
1940s, a Rectification (zhengfeng) movement was directed at party cadres themselves.
10  Mobilization 
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Undertaken in all the Communist base areas, the Rectification Campaign required party 
members—after studying assigned documents in small groups—to prepare confessions 
detailing the ways in which their own thoughts and actions had strayed from official standards 
(Selden 1971:188-200).  At first, self-criticism did not come easily: “Aversion to confession 
seemed to be universal, and the party branch secretary had to do something to alleviate the 
participants’ fears . . . Personifying the party as a benevolent father helped the participants in 
the rectification class make great headway in revealing their inner thoughts” (Chen Yung-fa 
1986: 335-337). Recalcitrants were not only encouraged by the promise of paternalistic 
leniency to those who made a clean breast of things; they were also subjected to intense group 
pressure until they complied with party demands. As Mark Selden explains, the rectification 
process revealed an astute grasp of the fundamentals of social psychology: 
 
Recent studies of group dynamics underline the immense psychological 
power groups can wield over their members. In particular, one is impressed 
by the awesome pressures to conform to group norms experienced by 
individuals who are unanimously declared “sick” or insane. The “patient” is 
able to save himself, in the sense of restoring his own self-esteem as well as 
being reincorporated into the group, only by demonstrating complete 
acceptance of group values and norms. These pressures were effectively 
increased in the rectification movement through small-group study and 
discussions that included the criticism of every cadre by his peers and 
searching self-criticism (Selden 1971: 195). 
 
The use of group- and self-criticism in party rectification was rather different from the mass 
criticism sessions that served as a prelude to the executions of landlords or counter-
revolutionaries. For one thing, the process was carried out behind closed doors. For another, 
the purpose of rectification was to educate—rather than to eliminate—the targets of struggle 
(Writing Group 1988; Zhang 1958; Zhong 1957).   
  As we have seen, Land Reform and the Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries 
Campaign proved effective in disposing of enemies from the pre-Communist era. But, as the 
Hungarian Revolt of 1956 indicated so graphically, socialism engenders its own contra-
dictions. Profoundly shaken by events in Budapest (and Warsaw as well), Mao called upon 
the Chinese people to engage in a Hundred Flowers Campaign intended to eliminate 
“bureaucratism” and related shortcomings of his Communist regime. Intellectuals in particular 
were encouraged to raise complaints about official misconduct, after which chastened cadres 
were expected to undertake reflection and reform. When the winds of popular criticism blew 
more furiously than Mao had anticipated, however, the Hundred Flowers gave way to an 
Anti-Rightist Campaign directed against those who had dared to voice opinions deemed 
beyond the pale by party authorities.  
  If the Hundred Flowers had been intended as a relatively mild variant of recti-
fication, the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 was its monstrous stepchild. During the 
campaign, rectification methods of group- and self-criticism were refined and elaborated into 
a full-blown program of thought reform (or “brainwashing” as it was called by its detractors).  
Hundreds of thousands of intellectuals were packed off to labor reform camps, 
euphemistically dubbed “revolutionary universities,” where they were subjected to a relentless 
regimen of group criticism to be followed by personal confession. Although the goal was 
rehabilitation, the process was brutal. Solitary confinement, chains, and torture were often an 
integral part of the experience. 
  Robert Lifton, a Yale psychiatrist who interviewed dozens of thought-reform 
veterans, writes that the procedure “aimed at breaking down every emotional identification 
which could interfere with the full acceptance of the new Communist identity” (1963: 383-
384). Often this goal was attained. As Lifton discovered, many of those who went through the Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution 
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ordeal “underwent a profound religious experience. They regarded thought reform as fine and 
ennobling and felt genuinely reborn, along with their society. The zealous convert was usually 
youthful, either an adolescent or a young adult” (Lifton 1963: 400). 
  How was this sometimes remarkably successful process developed? Lifton stresses 
that thought reform was not the brainchild of professional psychologists, whether Russian or 
Chinese. There is no evidence that social scientists or medical specialists played any sig-
nificant role in devising these powerful techniques. According to Lifton, the quasi-religious 
flavor of the approach (which highlighted feelings of sin and guilt that are quite alien to the 
Chinese tradition) may have come from Russian methods of extracting confessions from 
condemned prisoners. Nevertheless, Lifton emphasizes that Chinese thought reform differed 
sharply from Soviet practices in that the Chinese insisted on the possibility of re-education. 
Whereas Soviet prisoners were to be shot once they had confessed, those subjected to Chinese 
thought reform were expected to emerge reborn as committed converts to Communism. This 
distinction was evidently related to a Confucian emphasis (consistent with Marxism-
Leninism) on the fundamental malleability and perfectibility of human beings (Lifton 1963: 
chapter 20; Munro 1977). The traditional belief in education (effected in large part through 
social pressure) shaped a variety of Chinese Communism quite unlike its Soviet exemplar: 
 
Nor were Chinese improvisations always approved by Russian advisors: 
Chang [the early Communist leader, Zhang Guotao] mentioned that on 
several occasions Chinese Communist leaders were criticized for being “too 
much influenced by Confucian ethics.” Yet this moral and psychological 
emphasis seemed to come naturally to them; according to Chang, they were 
“good psychiatrists.” And although the Nationalists made similar efforts to 
“reform” Communists and Communist sympathizers in special “repentance 
camps,” their efforts were (according to Chang and many other observers) 
much more clumsy and much less effective ( Lifton 1963: 395). 
 
  Why the Communists proved so much more adept at emotion work than their 
Guomindang opponents is not entirely clear, but several considerations come to mind. For one 
thing, Communist cadres tended to issue from somewhat lower socioeconomic backgrounds 
than their Nationalist counterparts, thereby putting them on a closer footing (culturally and 
psychologically, and materially) with most of the people they were attempting to mobilize 
(North 1952). For another, the Guomindang’s persistent tendency to identify popular 
mobilization with Communist influence intensified their own distance from the masses. 
  Mao Zedong himself was intensely attuned to the importance of human 
psychology—including the elitist mentality of Chinese intellectuals—and devoted much of 
his writings to an exploration of its role in revolutionary transformation. Mao’s idiosyncratic 
interpretation of the key Marxist concept of class assigned far more weight to changeable 
emotional identities than to objective economic position. As he wrote at the start of the 
Rectification Campaign in 1942: 
 
If you want the masses to understand you, if you want to be one with the 
masses, you must make up your mind to undergo a long and even painful 
process of tempering. Here I might mention how my own feelings changed. 
I began life as a student and at school acquired the ways of a student; I then 
used to feel it undignified to do even a little manual labor, such as carrying 
my own luggage in the presence of my fellow students, who were incapable 
of carrying anything, either on their shoulders or in their hands. At that time 
I felt that the intellectuals were the only clean people in the world, while in 
comparison workers and peasants were dirty…. But after I became a revolu-
tionary and lived with workers and peasants and with soldiers of the Mobilization 
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revolutionary army, I gradually came to know them well, and they gradually 
came to know me well too. It was then, and only then, that I fundamentally 
changed the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois feelings implanted in me in the 
bourgeois schools. I came to feel that compared with the workers and 
peasants the unremoulded intellectuals were not clean and that, in the last 
analysis, the workers and peasants were the cleanest people and, even 
though their hands were soiled and their feet smeared with cow-dung, they 
were really cleaner than the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intellectuals. 
That is what is meant by a change in feelings, a change from one class to 
another (Mao 1971: 255).  
 
But Mao was not content to limit his emotional crusade to party members or intellectuals; he 
was insistent that the entire country should feel a similar degree of enthusiasm for the 
revolutionary cause. Mass ecstasy, Mao believed, was efficacious not only for revolutionary 
struggle, but for dramatic economic breakthroughs as well. 
 
MAO’S MASS CAMPAIGNS 
 
The Great Leap Forward was launched in 1958 as an effort to permit China to leap-frog 
overnight from agrarian backwardness to industrialized communism. Arguing that mass 
enthusiasm could jump-start the stalled economy, Mao boasted that China would soon surpass 
first England, and then the United States, in steel production. The atmosphere of the Great 
Leap was almost millenarian, with Mao promising to lead his countrymen toward a 
superhuman breakthrough. Disappointed by the response of intellectuals during the Hundred 
Flowers Campaign, the Chairman returned now to a more reliable constituency: the peasantry. 
As it turned out, however, methods that had worked wonders in eliminating class enemies 
during Land Reform were not equally suited to the sober task of economic development. The 
results fell tragically short of Mao’s fantasies, plunging the Chinese countryside into the worst 
famine in human history.  
  Nothing symbolized the folly of the Great Leap more vividly than the ill-fated 
backyard steel furnaces. An English visitor to China in the autumn of 1958 reported, 
 
We walked through the paddy fields to another village where four 
monstrous home-made blast furnaces had been rigged up. The place was a 
furious, seething, clattering scene of frenzy. People carried baskets of ore, 
people stoked, people goaded buffalo carts, people tipped cauldrons of 
white hot metal, people stood on rickety ladders and peered into furnaces, 
people wheeled barrows of crude metal—though to me the stuff that was 
being poured out at the bottom of the furnaces looked exactly like the stuff 
that was being poured in at the top (Wollaston 1960: 115) 
 
To organize this colossal (waste of) effort, “people’s communes” were formed. The new 
institution, whose name suggested the ultimate fulfillment of Marxist prophecies, heightened 
the sense of chiliastic anticipation. As a grassroots cadre in Southeast China recalled of the 
quasi-religious atmosphere,  
  
At that point everyone seemed to be caught up by this frantic socialist 
devotion. Nobody had any doubt that we could achieve these goals. Was it 
not true that we had already entered the final Communist stage when we 
organized these rural communes? A paradise materialized through the 
guidance of the party and Chairman Mao. I was a true believer then…. The 
Liberation brought to us our rebirth (Huang 1989: 58-59).  Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution 
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Mass devotion and enthusiasm, it turned out, was no substitute for economic infrastructure. 
The thirty million casualties of the Great Leap Forward were horrible proof of the limits of 
this precipitous approach to industrialization.  
  But if the material base was resistant, might not the superstructure prove more 
amenable to mass transformation? In the years following the debacle of the Great Leap, Mao 
turned his attention to questions of ideology and culture—a preoccupation that eventuated in 
1966 in the launching of the Cultural Revolution. Aware perhaps that frenzied campaigns 
were reaching a point of diminishing returns among the peasantry, Mao reached out to a less 
jaded audience. In this, his final crusade, the Chairman called upon the most impressionable 
and malleable members of society —the youth of China—to take up the revolutionary torch.  
  The so-called madness of the Cultural Revolution did not emerge out of nowhere 
(White 1989). Activists in the Cultural Revolution were quite self-conscious in drawing upon 
earlier repertoires of contention. Gao Yuan recalls in his autobiographical account of Red 
Guard experiences that, when it came time to launch struggles against “capitalist roaders” at 
his school, the secretary of his class Youth League “suggested we take inspiration from 
Chairman Mao’s report on the peasant movement in Hunan province, written in the 1920s, 
which described how the peasants had put dunce caps on the heads of local tyrants and evil 
gentry and paraded them through the streets” (Gao 1987: 50). Similarly, Yue Daiyun observes 
in her memoir of the Cultural Revolution at Beijing University that “[t]he idea of parading 
enemies had originated in the 1920s when the Communist Party, pursuing its work among the 
peasants, often forced the landlords to march in front of those they had formerly oppressed, 
every landlord wearing a tall, pointed hat bearing a description of his wrongdoing. Now in the 
frenzy of the moment, the students had no time to fashion enough hats, so they used 
wastebaskets instead . . .” (Yue and Wakeman 1985: 157). 
  Cultural Revolution methods of mass criticism took inspiration from urban, as well 
as rural, traditions of protest. As Jeffrey Wasserstrom has observed, student protesters in the 
May Fourth Movement of 1919 organized mass rallies, shouted slogans, staged public 
parades, delivered streetside harangues, and pasted up condemnatory wall posters 
(Wasserstrom 1991: Chapter 3).
11  Factory workers could also lay claim to a colorful, and 
evidently still accessible, heritage of struggle. It was probably no coincidence that Shanghai’s 
Number Seventeen Cotton Mill, where rebel commander Wang Hongwen worked, had in the 
mid-1920s been the scene of labor violence strikingly similar to that of Cultural Revolution 
criticism sessions. In a 1925 incident at the factory, workers had tricked a hated foreman into 
attending a mass meeting at which he was publicly denounced. The hapless foreman was 
forced to kneel in front of the crowd with hands tied behind his back (in what came to be 
known during the Cultural Revolution as the painful “airplane position”), a dunce cap was 
placed on his head, and a placard reading “Down with this traitor and running dog” hung 
across his chest. Photographs of the occasion were posted at the factory gate to serve as 
warning lest the unseated overseer ever try to resume his post (Zhang 1953: 61-70).   
  Liang Heng’s eyewitness account of a Cultural Revolution mass criticism session 
indicates the unmistakable continuities with previous patterns of struggle:   
 
There were all kinds [of criticism meetings], every day, big and small, but 
the one that made the deepest impression on me was the sort called 
“traveling struggle.” It was a lot like the way the People’s Liberation Army 
had dealt with the landlords after Liberation (I’d seen that in movies), but 
even more cruel. 
 
The loudspeaker called us all outside, and in a few minutes I saw it coming. 
A group of Rebels were in the lead shouting “Down with the Capitalist 
Roaders” and “Long Live Chairman Mao Thought.” Following them were 
about ten of the old “leading comrades” tied together on a long rope like Mobilization 
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beads on a string, their hands bound. They were wearing tall square-topped 
paper hats inscribed with phrases like I AM A BASTARD or I AM A 
FOOL, and around their necks were wooden signs with their names and 
crimes…. 
 
The Capitalist Roaders [knelt] on the platform, their hands tied behind their 
backs with long ropes…. [T]hey had to recite the big character posters 
attacking them. The meeting went on and on, and whenever someone 
stumbled there were cries of “Give him an airplane ride, give him an 
airplane ride!” At this the Rebels tossed the rope binding the man’s arms 
behind him over a pipe at the top of the auditorium and hoisted him up in 
the air, letting him squirm in agony like a dragonfly with pinched wings 
(Liang and Shapiro 1983: 77-79). 
 
But if the form of the Cultural Revolution was patterned closely on earlier revolutionary 
exemplars, the substance was vastly different. Occurring in a context where landlords and 
capitalists had already been eliminated, much of the campaign involved the manufacturing of 
subjectively defined class enemies. 
  Even more than in previous instances of mass mobilization, the Cultural Revolution 
relied on emotional transformation as a catalyst for carrying out these cruel acts. As Richard 
Madsen has argued, “ceremonies of innocence” were often superseded by “rituals of struggle” 
over the course of this decade-long campaign (Madsen 1984). The Cultural Revolution 
showed yet again, if further proof were required, just how volatile and fluid individual 
emotions can become in the context of group politics. Former Red Guard Gao Yuan described 
his contradictory feelings when the spearhead of struggle was pointed at one of his favorite 
teachers, a kindly man by the name of Li: “I tried to push my liking for Li out of my mind and 
concentrate on his crimes. The latest posters had accused him of yearning to ‘change the 
heavens,’ to return to the old days, to restore Kuomintang rule…. As I thought of these things, 
I began to hate Teacher Li. Yet part of me still liked him” (Gao 1987: 51). 
  The plasticity and ambivalence of human emotions helps perhaps to make sense of 
some of the more shocking dimensions of the Cultural Revolution ordeal. Wang Youqin’s 
sobering study of Red Guard violence finds that favored teachers could turn into despised 
targets of struggle, literally overnight. Moreover, Wang points out that some of the most 
vicious classroom cruelty was perpetrated by girls at elite middle schools (Wang 1995). 
Although the privileged background of these girls makes their sudden resort to violence 
especially shocking, it seems likely that turbulent adolescent emotions contributed to the 
unusual fervor with which they performed their Cultural Revolution roles.
12 But age was 
hardly a barrier to emotional transformation; adults as well as adolescents proved highly 
susceptible to the power of collective suggestion. Furthermore, the disintegration of state 
authority that marked some periods of the Cultural Revolution permitted mass violence to 
unfold without the restraints of cadre supervision. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The struggle sessions of the Cultural Revolution represented the apotheosis of the emotion 
work that had fueled the Communists’ revolution from its earliest days. While the 
Communists had built upon pre-existing traditions of popular protest, they systematized such 
practices as part of a conscious strategy of political and psychological engineering. The link 
between violent acts and emotional liberation had been clearly recognized at the outset of the 
revolutionary process, perhaps as a product of the early Communists’ fascination with 
anarchist ideas (Zarrow 1990; Dirlik 1991). During the build-up to the Three Workers’ Armed 
Uprisings of 1926-27, for example, groups of armed workers roamed the streets of Shanghai Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution 
 
 
123 
 
with CCP approval as a kind of terrorist hit squad explicitly intended to “stimulate worker 
enthusiasm” for the revolutionary enterprise (Perry, forthcoming).  
  When the Communists had cultivated more of a popular base, they were able to 
move beyond terrorism to mass campaigns. But they never abandoned the commitment to 
emotion work, or for that matter to the use of violence, in exciting mass passions in service to 
larger political and economic goals.  Although these efforts met with varying degrees of 
success, they suggest that CCP leaders appreciated what Western social scientists are only 
beginning to understand: emotions cannot be dismissed simply as a residual, irrational domain 
of consciousness. Rather, emotional gestures and utterances hold a unique capacity “to alter 
the states of the speakers from whom they derive.” 
13 
  The success of the Chinese Communists in developing and perfecting the art of mass 
mobilization goes some distance toward explaining their victory over the rival Guomindang. 
Although the Nationalists also made attempts to develop a popular following, they were 
hampered in these efforts by a conservative outlook that bespoke a deep distrust and fear of 
mass spontaneity (Hung 1994). As Paul Cohen has discovered in his study of national 
humiliation commemorations, as soon as the Nationalists gained political control in the spring 
of 1927, they moved swiftly to tame and formalize these expressions of mass emotion (Cohen 
2002). Instead of permitting spontaneous public gatherings of national outrage and sorrow, as 
had previously been the practice, the GMD instructed schools, companies, and other units to 
send one or two delegates to highly routinized annual observances (Cohen, personal 
communication). In contrast to the CCP, the GMD recoiled at the prospect of mass action. 
  The Chinese Communists’ skill at “moving the masses” also helps to highlight a key 
distinction between Chinese and Soviet variants of Communism.
14 Whereas Stalin was 
content to rely upon the secret police to carry out his purges (Fitzpatrick 1999), Mao Zedong 
insisted upon popular involvement. Such widespread participation, he argued, was necessary 
in order to ensure the continuation of the revolution under socialism. Moreover, Mao believed 
that the emotional enthusiasm generated during these campaigns could be put to use in 
economic development as well. Energized by the disciplining of successive waves of counter-
revolutionaries, the masses were expected to throw themselves into their jobs with renewed 
vigor. Rather than treating class struggle as a one-time event to be followed by a more relaxed 
brand of political and economic consolidation, the techniques of emotion work were deployed 
repeatedly (albeit targeted at and carried out by different groups) throughout Mao’s reign.  
  Even in the post-Mao era, the legacy of mass mobilization continues to exert a 
powerful influence over the attitudes and actions of Chinese state authorities and ordinary 
citizens alike (Zhang 1987). According to the post mortem of a central participant, the 
Tiananmen protests of 1989 were fatally flawed by the students’ own unconscious acceptance 
of many of the tenets of Maoist revolution (Liu 1994). Although the brutal suppression of that 
movement may have tarnished the reputation of the People’s Liberation Army [PLA] in the 
eyes of many Chinese, within the space of a decade the government seemed to have largely 
erased such misgivings through an extraordinary campaign designed to eulogize the role of 
the PLA in fighting the disastrous floods of 1998. A propaganda blitz ranging from television 
programs and movies to dramas and ballets employed highly melodramatic techniques to 
depict the heroism and sacrifice of the soldiers. The outpouring of popular support that such 
performances elicited toward a government whose flawed policies of water conservancy 
deserved much of the blame for the calamitous inundations is surely related to the continuing 
skillful deployment of emotion work—now strengthened by the use of new media technology. 
  The practice of deploying emotion-laden mourning rituals for larger political 
purposes also lives on in new ways in contemporary China. During the May Thirtieth 
Movement of 1925, specially trained student troupes of mourners (e.g., the Kneel and Wail 
Corps of Tianjin) had gathered at mass memorial services to sob in unison (Wasserstrom 
1991: 113).
15 In April of 1989, the death of disgraced Party Secretary Hu Yaobang triggered 
the Tiananmen student demonstrations as protesters vied with officials to control the Mobilization 
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mourning ceremonies (Calhoun 1994). Fearful of a repetition of such challenges to authority, 
state authorities moved rapidly after the U.S. bombing of China’s Belgrade embassy in May 
of 1999 to ensure that they would not be upstaged by nationalistic students.  When the top 
leadership gathered to pay their respects to the deceased bombing victims, televised shots of a 
tearful Premier Zhu Rongji captured public attention. 
  The suppression campaign that party leaders launched against Falun Gong in the 
summer of 1999 offers further evidence of the lingering influence of a now modernized 
tradition of revolutionary “emotion work.” Television broadcasts showed bereaved relatives 
of Falun Gong victims unburdening themselves of their strong feelings toward the alleged evil 
cult that had led their kinsmen astray. Sobbing denunciations of Master Li Hongzi blamed 
Falun Gong’s supreme leader for the tragedies of insanity, suicide, starvation, and even 
murder that had befallen parents, children or spouse. While there is some doubt as to how 
effective this particular campaign will prove in the long run (or whether mass media can 
sustain the level of popular enthusiasm that was once generated by face-to-face dynamics), 
there is no question but that the Ministry of Propaganda’s methods of conducting the initiative 
bore more than a family resemblance to previous mass campaign strategies (Perry 2000). 
  The government is not alone in being able to draw upon familiar techniques of 
emotional mobilization, however. Opponents of state policies may also turn to this tradition to 
muster resistance to official initiatives. Anthropologist Jing Jun discovered this phenomenon 
when investigating recent protests against government resettlement programs in a remote rural 
county in Northwest China: 
 
In interviews about these protests, county officials noted with irony that the 
Communist “recalling-bitterness tradition,” used to stir up grassroots 
resentment against the oppressiveness of the pre-Communist order, was 
now being employed by resettled villagers to air their grievances against 
Communist officials…. Commenting on this ritual’s contemporary usages, 
one county official said, “The local masses really mastered our recalling-
bitterness tradition. But who could have expected that they would be using 
it against government workers today?” Other officials made similar 
complaints, lamenting that they could no longer visit the villages without 
being pursued by older women eager to tell them—with much wailing and 
cursing—how much they suffered (Jing 1999: 330-331).  
 
The Communist Chinese repertoire of emotionally laden political rituals is thus a double-
edged sword that can be wielded not only by state officials, but also by disgruntled citizens. 
  To explain fully the origins, evolution, and contemporary implications of Communist 
Chinese emotion work will obviously require a much more detailed exploration than what I 
have attempted here. My hope, however, is that this preliminary discussion can serve to 
stimulate a more comprehensive investigation of this fascinating issue. Future work will want 
to explore why it is—in a given cultural setting—that certain strategies succeed brilliantly in 
eliciting and sustaining emotional commitment whereas others fail miserably. We will also 
want to understand the ways in which emotional appeals and responses may vary 
systematically across divisions of class, age, gender and local culture. Of further interest will 
be the relationship that different emotional states—hope, fear, regret, shame, anger, and so 
forth—may bear to different types of revolutionary (and post-revolutionary) action. As 
perhaps the world’s most experienced and effective practitioners of emotionally charged mass 
mobilization, Mao and his latter-day lieutenants warrant the serious attention of social 
scientists both inside and outside the China field.
16  
  A perspective highlighting the role of emotions in revolutionary mobilization does 
not supplant alternative explanations of revolutionary success. But it may allow us better to 
appreciate the ways in which factors such as ideology, organization, symbolism, class Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution 
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cleavages, and international influences must be suffused with emotional impact if they are to 
have the power to move ordinary people to revolutionary action. 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1 Recent anthropological and psychiatric studies of Chinese communities indicate, however, that Chinese (like other 
people) are both sociocentric and egocentric (Kleinman and Kleinman, 1997). 
2 See Esherick and Wasserstrom (1994) for the impact of this theatrical tradition on the Tiananmen Uprising of 1989. 
3 Hinton (1967: chapter 36) provides a telling example of the manner in which grassroots cadres could intervene to 
temper mass enthusiasm for revenge. 
4 As Mao wrote in his Hunan report, “A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or 
doing embroidery; it cannot be so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous . . . Without using the 
greatest force, the peasants cannot possibly overthrow the deep-rooted authority of the landlords…. The rural areas 
need a mighty revolutionary upsurge, for it alone can rouse the people in their millions to become a powerful force.” 
5 In this sense, violence could perform a function similar to that of speaking out the “hidden transcript;” i.e., giving 
voice to sentiments that had formerly been exchanged only outside the hearing range of the authorities (Scott 1990).  
6 As Vera Schwarcz (1997) has noted, speaking bitterness could also have negative effects on participants. 
7 Ding Ling (1954) is a fictional, yet historically accurate, narrative that highlights the importance of emotion work in 
carrying out land reform. 
8 Of course, moral economists have long emphasized the importance of such sentiments in generating popular protest. 
See, for example, Thompson (1971). A recent review of this approach to collective action can be found in Randall 
and Charlesworth (1999). 
9 Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion is taken from an internal-circulation bulletin published by the 
Shanghai trade union, entitled Gongyun qingkuang [Labor movement situation]. Labeled “top secret,” it was intended 
for leading cadres within the union. Numbers 65 (May 5, 1951), 66 (May 5, 1951) and 69 (May 17, 1951) contain 
detailed descriptions of the proper procedures for holding accusation meetings. The materials are held in the Shanghai 
Municipal Archives, #C1-2-397. 
10 Robert Lifton (1963: 393-395) traces the beginnings of thought reform back to Communist efforts to win over 
military prisoners in the 1920s; however, as he points out, it was only with the zhengfeng of 1942-1944 that these 
procedures became systematized. 
11 See also Chow (1967: 99-116) for a description of the students’ resort to ritualistic shaming and violent 
confrontation as a strategy for heightening public emotions during the May Fourth Movement. 
12 Here one is tempted to draw parallels to the hysteria that swept adolescent girls, in particular, during the Salem 
witch trials. Arthur Miller’s The Crucible provides a riveting dramatic recreation. 
13 Reddy (1997: 327) argues that poststructuralist theories fail to capture “the two-way character of emotional 
utterances and acts, their unique capacity to alter what they “refer” to or what they “represent” —a capacity which 
makes them neither “constative” nor “performative” utterances, but a third type of communicative utterance entirely, 
one that has never received adequate theoretical formulation.” See also Reddy (1999).  
14 Kenez’s (1985) thoughtful study suggests that, despite Lenin’s stress on agitation and propaganda techniques, mass 
struggle sessions were not a part of the Soviet repertoire. See also Yu (1964) for an argument that, Soviet influence 
notwithstanding, the Chinese Communists themselves developed many distinctive forms of mass mobilization 
15 Organized mourners had also played a role in rural rebellion. A group operating in North China in the early 
twentieth century, known as the Mourning Clothes Society, was famous for unnerving its opponents by performing 
three kowtows and weeping loudly (the traditional mourning ritual) before engaging in battle. See Perry (1980: 204). 
16 The Chinese Communists do not stand alone in this endeavor, of course. For a study of ways in which the Nazis 
drew upon emotional religious experiences to mobilize the German masses against Jews and Communists (as well as 
against the Weimar state), see Kershaw (1999). 
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